19 August 2025

Hannah Doncaster, a paralegal in the clinical negligence team considers the case of  Price v Marston’s PLC [2024] which involves Mrs. Price, the administrator of her late Husband’s estate. Mr. Price was employed by Marston’s as a chef. While at work, he tripped over raised metal on the floor and injured himself. Two months later, he died from an infection that developed after the fall.

Marston’s admitted liability for the accident, but the parties could not agree on appropriate compensation for lost services. A further trial was scheduled, and both sides appealed the judge’s decisions.

First Appeal: Marstons’s

Marston’s first ground of appeal was that the judge wrongly determined that Mr. Price’s fall caused his infection and subsequent death. The judge heard from experts in anesthesia and intensive care and ultimately preferred Mrs. Price’s expert evidence. The judge believed the evidence presented by expert Mr. Power was ‘more balanced in his presentation’ and made ‘concessions’. The judge went on to suggest ‘the mechanism and physics of the fall, lends support to Dr Power’s view of a skin abrasion or laceration’ that led to infection.

The judge also preferred the Claimant’s microbiology expert evidence, who argued that, but for the fall, there would have been no breach in Mr. Price’s skin, and no pathway for infection. The judge criticized the defendant’s expert, as ‘his basis for the conclusion in his report was from clinical experience and not a body of opinion or research’.

Second Appeal: Mrs. Price

Mrs. Price appealed the judge’s decision on her husband’s life expectancy. Both parties agreed there should be a reduction in the base figure because of underlying obesity but disagreed as to the correct reduction. The judge ultimately preferred the 8-year reduction figure produced by the Claimant’s expert evidence due to advanced reasons for positioning on the scale, in comparison to the Defendant experts’ less detailed response.

The appeal was allowed, which increased Mr. Price’s life expectancy from 76.5 years to 77.5 years, and the future loss multiplier thereby rose from 9.08 to 10.11.

Third Appeal: Mrs. Price

Mrs. Price also appealed the judge’s assessment of financial dependency.

The original judgment was deemed to be contrary to the established principle. It was concluded that the judge had ‘embarked on a course which was not justified. He departed from the established method and then complained that he did not have the evidence to allow him to do so reliably. That was a compelling reason for him not to depart from the established method in the first place’.